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This case was prepared for a class discussion rather than to demonstrate 
either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation, and 
is based on interviews with 14 present and former volunteer board mem-
bers, senior staff, and community leaders, as well as press coverage, annual 
reports, and internal documents. The authors are deeply grateful to their 
interviewees for their hospitality and collaboration. 
Credit: AT&T Performing Arts Center, Margot and Bill Winspear Opera House, Photo credit: Andreas Praefcke.
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 n January 2008, with physical construction of the 
brand new AT&T Performing Arts Center (AT&T PAC) 
campus underway for three years and a grand open-
ing scheduled in 20 months, the Center’s capital cam-
paign reached its $275 million goal. In fact, a $10 million 
pledge from Nancy Hamon had just put the total amount 
pledged above the goal, to $277 million. The same day, 
the board of the Center (then known as the Dallas Center 
for the Performing Arts) voted on a proposed increase 
in the goal for the capital campaign, to $338 million. The 
purpose of this increase was the aesthetic enhancement 
of the public spaces of the two new buildings, as well as 
an upgrade to the rehearsal hall that would also make it a 
suitable venue for performances and special events. 
This was neither the first nor the last time the board 
would need to consider whether the funding demands of 
their ambitious building project could be covered by their 
capital campaign. Time and again, the question before 
the board was: how much of a performing arts center 
could Dallas afford? 
I
AT&T Performing Arts Center   3Cultural Policy Center at the University of Chicago
PROJECT  GENES IS
he planning for the AT&T PAC proceeded in bursts, 
and during the initial stages, the project advanced 
only by virtue of the efforts of the Dallas Opera and 
the Dallas Theater Center (DTC). The first push was spear-
headed by John Dayton and Bess Enloe, former chairs of 
the Opera and DTC respectively, at the requests of these 
organizations. In the early years, Dayton and Enloe had 
only one other fellow board member, although the board 
eventually expanded to about 12 people, all of them trust-
ees and generous supporters of either the Opera or the 
DTC, and all friends of Dayton and Enloe for decades. They 
met in their living rooms. Except for personal assistants 
employed by individual members, the project was being 
run by volunteers without any professional staff. They did, 
however, retain multiple top-tier professional consulting 
firms to help them plan.
In early 2000, their professional consultants informed the 
nascent board of a $100 million chasm between their am-
bitions and their means. The project cost was estimated 
by Donnell Consultants Incorporated at $265 million. This 
budget projection was based on a preliminary building 
program written by the board, with the assistance of other 
consultants, after two years of conversations with future 
resident groups and other community stakeholders. The 
AT&T PAC knew that the costs of running the campaign, 
acquiring the land, clearing the site, building parking, 
paying for construction bonds, starting an operational en-
dowment, and staging public events like groundbreaking, 
as well as other miscellanea, would increase that bud-
get further. Meanwhile, another consultant, the Brakeley 
Company, thought the AT&T PAC capital campaign could 
reasonably expect to raise no more than $160 million in 
private, philanthropic support. The City of Dallas expected 
to fund some of the costs with municipal bonds and would 
eventually make an $18 million investment in the AT&T 
PAC, as well as furnish some land. Yet the gap between 
expected costs and expected funds remained large.
Just as the consultants delivered their reports, the AT&T 
PAC hired its first staff member—the founding president 
and CEO, Bill Lively. Lively had a master’s in education 
and started his career as a member of the faculty at the 
Southern Methodist University in Dallas, where he eventu-
ally became the associate dean of the arts school and then 
the vice president for development and public affairs. In 
that capacity, Lively had designed and directed a cam-
paign that raised $280 million for the university before his 
departure. A native Dallasite, a gaunt man, and an avid 
mountain climber, Lively knew Dallas and its donors; he 
was a singular fundraiser with a lifelong passion for music 
and football. “I don’t think he ever sleeps,” said Enloe.
One challenge accepted by both Lively and the board in 
his hiring was his lack of experience building, program-
ming, or operating a performing arts venue. The board 
chose him and he took the job since during his tenure at 
AT&T PAC he would have one main responsibility: raising 
money. “I didn’t want to run the Center. I wanted to build 
it,” said Lively. “Bill wanted to raise the money for what we 
wanted to build,” said AT&T PAC and DTC trustee, Deedie 
Rose. “He didn’t want to tell anyone what to build or how 
to build it. That was the kind of CEO he was.” Lively was 
conscious that the organization needed to face other 
challenges, like planning its operations and its finances, 
but both he and the board thought that the majority of his 
time needed to be dedicated to devising and executing a 
strategy for the capital campaign, and that others—includ-
ing trustees, professional consultants, and other staff, once 
they were hired—would do the bulk of the work necessary 
for success after opening. Once the Center approached its 
first season in 2009-2010, a new president would be hired 
to oversee programming and operations. Lively would 
move on to work his fundraising magic elsewhere.  
The disconnect between cost and funding projections 
was one of the first questions Lively had to address. The 
board’s certainty about key aspects of the building pro-
gram limited the prospects for a reduction in estimated 
costs. They were committed to building a campus of two 
buildings: an opera house and a dramatic theater. They 
also felt strongly that the architecture had to be distinc-
tive and that certain technical standards with regard to 
acoustics and backstage capabilities had to be met. A 
plan to stagger the construction of the buildings, and thus 
delay some of the capital costs, was briefly entertained. 
The opera house would be built first, with the $160 million 
in philanthropic funds projected by Brakeley. A multi-form 
theater for the DTC would follow in a second phase. How-
ever, the DTC feared that the first phase would exhaust 
funds and community enthusiasm for a new performing 
arts facility. Enloe had even asked her friend and the DTC 
chairwoman at the time, Deedie Rose, to join the AT&T 
PAC board so as to prevent the phasing plan. “The Theater 
Center is the smaller nonprofit, and we’d help the opera 
hall get built, but then the theater would never happen,” 
said Rose. After the phasing plan was scrapped due to the 
DTC’s objections, the board was left with only two options 
for dealing with the gap between cost and funding esti-
mates: discarding either the project or the Brakeley study. 
“If we do believe the report, we shouldn’t start this project, 
because there’s not going to be enough money to build it,” 
said Lively. 
T
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The Brakeley Company’s approach to quantifying a 
reasonable goal for the Dallas capital campaign was to 
conduct confidential interviews with Dallas donors. In 
these conversations, Brakeley shared a preliminary case 
statement for the proposed performing arts center and 
asked its interviewees about any potential causes for hes-
itation, as well as the size of their potential gifts and their 
expectations about who else would give and how much. 
In its report, Brakeley outlined the key considerations that 
could limit the size of philanthropic pledges and conclud-
ed that the scope of the project needed to be revised 
and the capital campaign goal set at $160 million.  
In the end, Lively chose to think of the Brakeley report as 
limited in its conclusions about the availability of funds 
among traditional arts donors. “That study was address-
ing predominantly reliable sources who had some history 
giving to a project such as this,” said Lively. “We knew 
we had to identify a whole other legion of donors.” A 
project like the AT&T PAC had never been attempted in 
Dallas before, and some of the donors the Center needed 
to involve had never given in Dallas or to the arts. Thus, 
their future gifts could not be captured in a study, and 
Lively’s approach to establishing a realistic target for 
fundraising was based on a best guess, combined with 
his knowledge of Dallas and his experience fundraising 
there. For him, there were two key questions. First, was 
there enough wealth in Dallas to pay for the project? 
The answer to the first question was a resounding yes. 
Second, could the AT&T PAC motivate a sufficient portion 
of the individuals, foundations, and companies who held 
this wealth to fund their project? “You can’t scientifically 
quantify that,” Lively said. “A capital campaign is a psy-
chological exercise, and if you doubt you can do it, you 
can’t do it,” Lively said. “Was it risky? Absolutely.” 
“I walked into the first meeting, and I said, here’s where 
we are, board members,” Lively remembered. “We have 
a vision. We have us. And we have a feasibility study that 
was developed by the Brakeley Company, and that fea-
sibility study says, ‘We might be able to raise up to $160 
million dollars to build a world-class center.’ But you can’t 
rebuild the Meyerson next door for that. So this study is 
of no use to us.” Lively continued, “Can we do this? Ab-
solutely. We have to believe in it and have to be faithful 
to the mission, and here we go.” Following that speech, 
he gave each of his board members a copy of Stephen 
Ambrose’s Undaunted Courage, a book about Lewis and 
Clark’s exploration of the American West. He asked them 
all to read it that night. “If they could do that, we could 
do this,” he said. A year later, he gave them copies of 
The Devil in the White City, the story of Chicago’s 1893 
World’s Columbian Exposition, another building project 
that at first seemed daunting. 
At its inaugural meeting with Lively and the newly 
expanded board, the trustees voted to proceed with 
a campaign to raise $275 million despite the Brakeley 
study’s conclusions. Lively described this act as a matter 
of Old West gumption. “That was uniquely Texan, in my 
opinion,” he said. “Their study was really inaccurate,” said 
Enloe, who then added wryly: “Or at least we didn’t like 
it.” In the end, the fundraising goal the board chose was 
based on the initial estimates of the amount of money 
needed to accomplish their objectives. Still, their faith in 
finding funds for any and all building program features 
was not without bounds. Over the next few years, as the 
design committee kept discovering more and more op-
portunities to enhance the project’s value by adding ele-
ments—such as another underground parking garage and 
a destination park—the board placed a soft cap of $300-
325 million on the total project cost. They also prioritized 
funding artistic spaces (the stage and backstage), over 
operational spaces (the lobby and restaurant). 
In a way, the story of overcoming the financial obstacle 
became part of the sales pitch for the AT&T PAC. In inter-
views, a few of the donors told of the Center’s planning 
committee rejecting and thwarting the consultant predic-
tions with pride. In the AT&T PAC fundraising bulletin, 
Stages, Lively described the organization as “scaling what 
often seemed insurmountable obstacles.”i The narrative of 
the campaign as Lively shaped it became about accom-
plishing something unprecedented, ambitious, and unique 
that beat people’s expectations. The size of the campaign 
became a selling point rather than a stumbling block. This 
narrative appealed to the locals’ perception of Dallas as a 
city of big ambitions, and the money poured in. 
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uring the two decades that the Dallas Opera and 
the DTC nursed and shaped the scope of the AT&T 
PAC project, several specific features of Dallas and 
its culture served as touchstones. The earliest to influence 
the AT&T PAC plans was the proposal to build an Arts 
District downtown. The official district was envisioned in 
the 1970s as a vibrant, mixed-use neighborhood where all 
of the city’s major cultural institutions were within walking 
distance of each other as well as restaurants, shops, and 
cafes. The area would draw tourists, encourage pedestrian 
activity, and spur economic development. The institutions 
themselves would also benefit from physical proximity to 
each other, increasing their collective prominence and ap-
peal. The city planners hoped the Arts District would look 
European, comparing their plans to the Centre Pompidou 
in Paris and the Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagen. Of course, 
as far as its citizens were concerned, Dallas was already 
as good as or better than these world-renowned cultural 
capitals, but too few people outside the city knew about 
this yet. In other countries, people still thought of Dallas 
as an oil and cattle town made famous by J.R. Ewing, and 
the new Arts District would point out their mistake. If the 
20-block, 63-acre district was filled by a passel of build-
ings of scope and architectural distinction that fit the city’s 
nickname of “the big D,” Dallasites surely would not mind. 
The first organization to move to the Arts District was 
the Dallas Museum of Art (DMA), which commissioned a 
design by Edward Larrabee Barnes. In 1978, the museum 
asked voters for $25 million for an Arts District facility, 
while other arts groups, including the Opera and the Dal-
las Symphony Orchestra, asked for another $30 million. 
The bond failed. A year and a publicity campaign later, a 
smaller bond issue passed, with $25 million for the DMA 
and $2.25 million to buy land for the Symphony. From then 
on, Dallas voters were generous towards the arts groups, 
approving another $28.6 million for the Meyerson Sym-
phony Hall in 1982. 
The Meyerson Symphony Hall project ran into large, highly 
publicized, and controversial cost overruns and construc-
tion delays. “Some of that criticism was justified, some 
was not, but the perception was there,” said Dayton. The 
turbulent infancy of the Meyerson depleted the com-
munity’s goodwill toward costly cultural projects and 
derailed early discussions between the Opera, the now 
defunct Dallas Ballet, and the DTC about a new home. The 
discussions had gotten far enough for the city to spend 
$26 million on a 5.6 acre site in 1983, but now the perform-
ing arts center project stalled. Neither a capital campaign 
nor a bond issue seemed possible. Instead, community 
groups convinced the city to build an outside amphithe-
ater for performances by small groups with city money, 
and the DTC built a cheap temporary facility nearby, a tin 
house designed to last only five years. When the Meyerson 
Symphony Center opened, it was three years late and cost 
$81.5 million to build. An additional $24.5 million had been 
spent on parking, grounds, and land for a total cost of 
$106 million—$56 million more than originally anticipated.
ii The city had contributed $56 million to the capital costs 
and would contribute $1.5 million every year to the opera-
tions.iii Meanwhile, the rest of the Arts District fell victim 
to the cycle of real estate boom and bust. In 1998, Dallas 
Morning News reporter David Dillon described it as “acres 
of parking lots and the relics of developer excess, includ-
ing the massive base of a skyscraper that never got off 
the ground.” Brakeley concluded that donors would find 
the idea of a new performing arts center to invigorate this 
stagnating neighborhood compelling. 
The opening of the Meyerson also exerted a powerful 
positive influence over prospective donors, since the hall 
was a resounding success with the world’s architectural 
press after opening, despite setbacks during construction. 
The architect chosen by the Symphony was I.M. Pei, and 
the acoustician, Russell Johnson. Although their artistic 
ambitions for the building had been cited as one of the 
reasons for the cost overruns earlier, now these ambitions 
became a cause célèbre. The lobby, with its unorthodox 
but aesthetically pleasing geometries and its travertine 
and marble finishes, was resplendent. Three hundred 
journalists, including critics from international daily papers, 
covered the opening festivities.iv Their reviews of the archi-
tecture and the acoustics were almost universally breath-
less, and the issue of financial prudency, even with the 
Symphony’s capital campaign still incomplete, dropped 
from the public eye. 
The success of the Meyerson made the fundraising climate 
hospitable again for cultural projects. By the mid-1990s, 
the Opera and the DTC were once again discussing plans 
for a new home together, next to the Meyerson on the land 
tract purchased for them a decade earlier by the city. Both 
organizations had powerful boards and generous support-
ers, but, unlike the Symphony, neither could succeed at a 
large capital campaign on its own. By uniting forces, and 
tapping both donor “families” as well as broadening the 
project to allow for other uses and donors outside their 
support base, these two founding companies thought they 
could finally succeed. Once they secured a planning grant 
from ExxonMobil in the late 1990s, they incorporated the 
Dallas Center for the Performing Arts Foundation. 
PROJECT  BACKG R OU ND AND G OALS
D
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oth the Opera and the DTC wanted to move due 
to the limitations of the venues in which they 
performed. Founded in 1957, the Dallas Opera was 
recognized as a leading regional opera company and 
aspired to become one of the top opera companies in the 
nation, a peer to the Lyric Opera of Chicago and the San 
Francisco Opera. This aspiration required the company 
to grow both financially and artistically, but in its home, 
the Music Hall at Fair Park, further growth along either 
dimension seemed unlikely. “It is a roadshow house,” said 
Dayton about the Music Hall, “meant to receive traveling 
Broadway shows, not a facility that had anywhere near 
the stage capabilities to support a regional opera com-
pany. It’s a cinematic auditorium, meaning it’s fan-shaped, 
clearly designed for amplified sound, not for raw voice. 
The Symphony got out as soon as they could, and the 
Opera wanted to follow close on their heels.”
In addition to limiting the quality of the Opera’s produc-
tions with its poor acoustics, small stage, and cramped 
backstage, the city-owned Music Hall also prevented the 
Opera from expanding its season, and therefore its budget 
and audience. In 1998, the Opera had an annual budget 
of about $9 million, roughly twice its size a decade earlier. 
About 40 percent of its revenues came from ticket sales, 
and about 50 percent from contributions. Its seasons 
consisted of five productions with 21 performances. It had 
11,000 subscribers and filled an average of 90 percent of 
the Music Hall’s 3,420 seats with paying ticket-buyers. The 
percentage of the total seats sold had flatlined in recent 
years. Expanding the season seemed like the only way to 
continue growing, but the Music Hall’s schedule was full, 
with performances by Dallas Summer Musicals, a Broad-
way series, and the Texas Ballet. 
For all these reasons, the Opera wanted a new home. 
However, it could neither mount a successful capital cam-
paign of sufficient size nor fill a venue’s schedule on its 
own. “Dallas Opera was an institution that couldn’t justify a 
facility of this size and cost by itself. It would need to part-
ner with other cultural institutions to make this a viable, 
long-term operating facility,” said Dayton. 
A partnership with the DTC—a seasoned group with an 
artistic reputation and financial stability on par with the 
Opera’s—seemed like a logical choice. The Dallas The-
ater Center was founded in 1959 and had since become 
an acclaimed regional theater company with a profes-
sional resident troupe of actors. In 1992, DTC had sold 
almost 100,000 tickets; by 1997, that number was down to 
82,000. In 1998, the DTC had a budget of $3.9 million, with 
ticket sales of $1.4 million and contributions of $2.4 mil-
lion, but the general trend in ticket and subscription sales 
was still one of decline. The DTC curtailed the number of 
performances, but still the overall percentage of capacity 
sold declined, too. 
“We’ve had the same artistic director for 15 years, and 
things around here just got stagnant, with our program-
ming and our fundraising and our ticket sales. There was 
no enthusiasm, no excitement, there was nothing build-
ing for this place,” said the managing director of the DTC, 
Mark Hadley. “We were in a 50-year-old building designed 
by Frank Lloyd Wright, which was very comfortable for 
the patrons, but backstage, it was very hard on us to pro-
duce theater. It boxed us in in terms of what we could do.”
Unlike the Opera, the DTC had complete control over the 
operations and scheduling at its two venues, the Kalita 
Humphreys Theater and the Arts District Theater, both of 
which it managed. In the Kalita, the company was severely 
handicapped by the theater’s technical limitations, and 
in the Arts District Theater by financial ones. The Kalita’s 
backstage areas were dark, cramped, and in need of repair. 
Frank Lloyd Wright had been opposed to elevators in prin-
ciple, and only one was installed for transporting sets to 
the stage from the loading dock. Apocryphally, the eleva-
tor had to be hidden from Wright by stacks of boxes when 
he came to visit. The flyhouse could support only a limited 
weight and had just nine lines for flying in sets, though the 
DTC had jerry-rigged some extra ones over the years. The 
house had 491 seats. Of these seats, for the past decade 
the DTC had filled just 61 percent. Because the DTC had 
built the theater, the city allowed the company its almost 
exclusive use for $1 per year. The DTC offices were next to 
the Kalita, as were the homes of many of the company’s 
wealthy subscribers, who lived in Highland Park. Hadley 
thought the proximity of this affluent enclave made the 
DTC seem elitist, whereas a downtown location would 
make theater seem more accessible. Attendance at the 
temporary Arts District Theater confirmed this suspicion. 
Overall, embarking on a plan to build the performing arts 
center represented a risk for the DTC. In initial discussions, 
a seating capacity of 700 was floated for the theater, 
and the company wondered whether it could fill all those 
seats. Eventually, the capacity was revised down to 575. 
The rent would certainly be higher than the $1 per year 
paid at the Kalita Humphreys, yet a flexible, technologi-
cally advanced new theater would offer the DTC a blank 
canvas. The excitement around a new, marquee building 
in downtown Dallas would give the company an opportu-
nity for rebirth. “It wasn’t really an option not to make this 
happen,” remembers Hadley about the discussions taking 
place among DTC staff. “Here comes the building. It kind 
of forces our hand. What do we want to be in that building 
and how do we make it happen?”
DALLAS  THEAT ER  C ENTER  AND TH E  DALLAS  OPE RA
B
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Eventually, as construction on the Center proceeded, the 
DTC board looked at its strategic plan. They hired a new 
artistic director who was a good match for the organi-
zation’s revised and sharpened vision, and launched an 
advancement campaign to raise $12 million in support of 
productions and increased occupancy expenses for the 
first five seasons in the new venue. 
After two years of planning, with the help of professional 
consultants, the new AT&T PAC board led by Dayton and 
Enloe identified several other artistic groups that wanted 
to perform in a better, newer venue. They included the 
Fort-Worth-based Texas Ballet and the internationally 
focused dance presenter, TITAS, for the 2,200-seat opera 
hall. The groups who wanted to perform in the smaller 
theater venue with the DTC included Anita Martinez 
Ballet Folklorico and Dallas Black Dance. Additionally, 
the new performing arts center would host a Broadway 
series, a lecture series produced by the AT&T PAC, and 
other touring and presented events. The schedules of 
both the proposed opera house and the theater were 
beginning to look full. 
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FUNDRAIS ING
DALLAS  PHILANTH R OP IC  LANDS C AP E
he Dallas philanthropic climate is distinguished by 
the city’s extraordinary concentration of wealth 
and the giving community’s high profile social 
calendar of events, as well as a competitive spirit that 
animates donors to fund endeavors that will make Dallas 
better than other cities in Texas, or the nation, or the 
world. Despite having an average household income 
that is slightly below the national average, Dallas has 
one of the largest concentrations of wealth in America. 
Dallas was the fourth most popular city to call home in 
the Forbes 400, the annual list of wealthiest people in 
the United States with fortunes over a billion. Dallas was 
home to 24 billionaires in 2009. The city is also a popular 
location for Fortune 500 company headquarters. In this 
list, Dallas ranks third in the United States, with 14 com-
panies headquartered there in 2009. 
In Dallas, philanthropy frequently acts as a social glue. 
Several of our interviewees remarked on the importance 
of the networks of donors and volunteers that surround 
specific organizations. A few organizations, like the Sym-
phony and the DMA, plan seasons of social events for their 
donors. One nonprofit, the Dallas Business Council for the 
Arts, places business executives on arts boards, where 
they can network professionally, in exchange for a guar-
antee of financial support from their employers. The social 
aspect of the philanthropic scene makes some boards 
tightly knit—most of the AT&T PAC core board members 
had been good friends for decades.
CAPITAL  CAMPAIG N OR G ANIZATION AND STR AT E GY
The consultant plans had anticipated that the organiza-
tion would need multiple full-time employees to start the 
design and capital campaign, but Lively wanted to run a 
cheap, lean operation. (The campaign ended up costing 
only 3.5¢ for every dollar raised.) “My first year, I was the 
president and CEO of me. I had a secretary. That was on 
purpose because we built the model around the cadre 
of qualified volunteers.” At the end of his first 12 months, 
Lively hired employee number three, a publications spe-
cialist to produce marketing materials. After another year, 
he hired a vice president to manage the construction. 
The opportunity to become one of these qualified 
volunteers was a perk offered to interested donors. The 
Brakeley report reminded its clients at the AT&T PAC that 
enthusiastic, generous boards always form the back-
bone of any capital campaign. For this reason, Brakeley 
worried about the AT&T PAC board’s small size. Indeed, 
extraordinarily committed trustees like Caren Prothro, 
who became the chair of the capital campaign, and 
Howard Hallam, the chairman of the board, were crucial 
to the Center’s fundraising efforts. But Lively also used 
the empty spaces on his board as an ultimate fundraising 
tool. They allowed him to offer a philanthropic oppor-
tunity of a lifetime—a chance for donors to be closely 
involved with the project they were funding, to make 
decisions, and to shape the future of the performing arts 
in Dallas—to people with means to make sizable gifts. 
The lean staffing at the organization itself also advanced 
this enterprise since, without staff, the board was never 
in danger of crossing the line and overmanaging. At the 
same time, armies of consultants were available to do the 
grunt work. The opportunities for involvement presented 
to the trustees were exciting—Deedie Rose, Bess Enloe, 
and John Dayton all sat on architect selection commit-
tees, for example. Dayton even went to London for long 
stretches of time to work on the design for the Winspear 
Opera House with the architects at the offices of Foster 
and Partners. All of the people joining the board and 
being given unparalleled opportunities to be closely 
involved and make a large impact were also expected to 
make sizable, seven- or eight-figure contributions. 
“These volunteers came on board with a clear view of the 
expectations of each of them,” Lively said. “I said to each 
something like this when they were appointed: ‘I’m inviting 
you to join this great adventure and serve and lead and, 
when I’ve earned the right, I want you to make a gift of X 
million dollars. There’s no ambiguity about that, and if you 
don’t want to do that, you really shouldn’t join. That’d be a 
waste of your time and ours.’” 
Everyone asked to join the board on these conditions 
agreed, although one individual refused initially before 
joining two years later. In addition to the ability to make a 
gift, the AT&T PAC looked for board members who could 
expand what Lively termed its “circles of influence” within 
the prospective donor community. “If we had all the same 
kinds of people—age, interests, profession, neighbor-
hood—it was encumbering. The common denominators 
were the commitment for the project and the ability to 
make a large gift.’” 
In general, the AT&T PAC got the gifts it requested more 
often than not—Lively said he calculated their batting 
average to be .700. “But we studied the pitchers. And 
we didn’t pitch very often,” Lively said. “It was all done 
unscientifically, but very strategically.” 
T
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The exact process followed was for Lively to meet confi-
dentially “with people of means” to identify and discuss 
donor prospects in their friendship networks three times 
a week for “many hours.” In this process, Lively described 
himself as the choreographer. He would ask wealthy 
people about their friends. First, he would want to know 
who had the means to make a seven-figure gift. Then he 
wanted to know what specific reasons would compel that 
person to make the donation. “We tried to find all of the 
messages and all of the reasons that someone would sup-
port this thing,” he said. For most of the potential donors, 
the primary reason to support the new performing arts 
center was civic pride. Some of these donors did not enjoy 
the performing arts at all and in fact dreaded attending 
theater and opera. But they were impressed with the vi-
sion of what the buildings would mean for the city. Of the 
133 donors who gave gifts of $1 million or more, most had 
never given to the arts before. This number was encourag-
ing to community leaders and donors who had expressed 
concerns that the capital campaign would drain all the 
arts funding. On the other hand, others wondered if com-
mitted arts leaders and supporters were being crowded 
out. Lively described the rationale behind these non-arts 
donors’ gifts as follows: “They made an investment in the 
future of one of the greatest cities in America—I’ve heard 
that one many times. They’ve made the city whole. They 
enhanced the quality of its landscape. They completed the 
Arts District. They did something that was good for the 
City of Dallas.” 
In his meetings, Lively also wanted to know who knew the 
person best and understood their thinking about philan-
thropy. Sometimes, he was acquainted with a donor and 
familiar with his or her philanthropy from his years running 
the campaign at Southern Methodist University, but many 
donors were new to him and to Dallas. Two $10 million gifts 
came from people he had not met before the campaign. 
Lively and his contacts would also discuss the merits of 
various settings for the prospect’s first introduction to the 
AT&T PAC, whether the first interaction should be a private 
conversation, a dinner party, or a reception at the Preview 
Center with its 20th-story view onto the site and its archi-
tectural models. After the first meeting, he would analyze 
how that contact went and then plot a course for the sec-
ond contact. When the time came to make the “ask,” he 
would discuss which “messages” should be presented to a 
prospect and which order would make the messages ap-
pear at their most effective. Then he would try to identify 
the best person to relay these messages and ask for the 
money. Sometimes, they would determine who the best 
person was to ask the prospective askers to do the asking 
and develop a strategy for getting them to say yes. They 
even discussed who the best person was to make the call 
for an appointment. 
At the meeting with the prospect, the chosen trustee or 
donor and Lively would discuss the project and stress the 
points they had previously decided would most appeal to 
that specific person. Many of the people asked by Lively to 
go to these meetings had already made large gifts them-
selves and could talk about the size of their commitment 
and their rationale. “They could say, I have done this for 
these reasons, and I think this is important. Then they would 
pass the baton to me, and I would describe the project and 
talk about specific particulars, and then I would make the 
ask or join a volunteer in making the ask,” said Lively. After 
this meeting, the crucial steps were following up with the 
prospects to get commitments, and then keeping in touch 
to inform them of key project developments so as to assure 
them of good stewardship of their funds. Lively also noted 
that despite the extensive planning of every detail, the 
actual interactions almost never completely adhered to the 
painstakingly developed script.
In Lively’s view, the most crucial decision for every ask was 
choosing the asker. “People will give to people, no matter 
what the project is, if they trust the people,” Lively said. 
“People of integrity will ask people of integrity for a gift 
and they’ll get it, because these guys will trust that the 
cause is noble.” 
The AT&T PAC also provided its donors with a steady 
stream of opportunities for recognition. “We were lucky to 
be able to publicly celebrate most of our donors,” Lively 
said, noting that for some prospects, seeing that substan-
tial commitments had already been made by respected 
Dallas philanthropists was persuasive. The AT&T PAC’s 
quarterly newsletter, Stages, was a sumptuous, profes-
sionally designed periodical printed on glossy cardstock 
the size of a folded newspaper and filled with profiles 
and pictures of smiling couples who had made seven- or 
eight-figure donations to the Center. Perhaps in order to 
distinguish the AT&T PAC project from the birthing pains 
at the Meyerson, Lively started each newsletter with a 
column in which he assured his audience, sometimes in 
italics, that both the construction and the campaign were 
on budget and on schedule. The dribble of press releases 
announcing gifts was relentless, creating the impression of 
inevitability of success. “We went through two economic 
downturns even before this latest fiasco and two wars, 
and we just kept chugging along,” said Enloe. Periodically, 
acclaimed celebrity performers like Tommy Lee Jones, 
Sidney Poitier, Dame Julie Andrews, and Hillary Swank 
would make appearances at the Center’s lecture series, 
the Brinker Forum, or at its events. These appearances 
would be heavily publicized and followed by pictures of 
major donors with these actors in Stages, conveying the 
impression that the AT&T PAC board was a desirable social 
institution to join. For a few years, Chuck Norris was listed 
as an official member of the board, though it is unclear if 
he ever came to the meetings.
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LOOKING TO TH E  FU TU R E :  F INANC ES  AND OP ERATION S
hus, from board building to staffing to articulating 
a purpose, the activities of the AT&T PAC focused 
almost single-mindedly on ensuring the success of 
the ambitious capital campaign. As the date of opening 
approached, however, questions about the shape and fi-
nancial feasibility of the Center’s future operations became 
increasingly urgent. 
Like so much of the planning, the Center’s business 
model was left to the volunteers on the operations 
committee of the board. This committee was chaired by 
Roger Enrico, formerly the CEO of PepsiCo and now the 
chairman of the board of Dreamworks Animation SKG. 
He and other trustees served as the principal clients for 
consultants who studied the issue and returned with 
forecasts and reports. One of the goals for the busi-
ness plan was reducing, if not eliminating, the need 
for unearned income within the annual budget. The 
hope was that the new AT&T PAC could sustain itself 
on earned revenue and compete as little as possible 
with other nonprofit organizations for gifts and grants. 
Lively thought this could be achieved with some cre-
ative thinking about untraditional sources of revenue, like 
premium memberships that would allow access to the 
artists and new models for working with corporations on 
sponsorships. Devising a plan took the consultants and 
the operations committee several years. In the end, their 
model called for an operating budget of $25-30 million, 
with the bulk covered through earned income sources 
and only $2.5-3 million raised through gifts and grants. 
(It should be noted that the AT&T PAC considers funds 
from corporations as income earned through its sponsor-
ship programs.) Lively negotiated a contract with the city 
for $2.5 million in annual operating support and secured 
a sponsorship deal with Lexus for the future Broadway 
series. He also began discussions with other corporations, 
one of which, AT&T, became the PAC’s general sponsor in 
2009 by agreeing to contribute an undisclosed amount 
to annual operations.
At the time the plan was devised, Dallas community lead-
ers worried about the lack of detail and about the business 
plan’s lengthy period of gestation. The staff of those 
groups slated to perform in the new Center also wished 
they had more details. While the volunteers on the AT&T 
PAC board were mainly interested in the feasibility of the 
annual fundraising requirements, the professional staff at 
the resident companies were keenly interested in details—
such as the scheduling process, fees, policies on unions, 
and the presence of Center staff at set load-ins. They 
needed estimates of how much their performances in the 
new venues would cost, and they wanted them several 
years ahead of the opening season. The Opera was com-
missioning a new work for its inaugural 2009-2010 season 
and had to commit itself financially in 2005 to make this 
happen. The DTC was making casting commitments. 
Meanwhile, the programming staff at the Center had yet 
to be hired. At this point in time, with no performing arts 
center yet in existence, the staff there was still limited and 
focused on the capital campaign.
Faced with this uncertainty about operations, the perform-
ing companies took different approaches to their first sea-
son budgets. The Opera asked the AT&T PAC operations 
committee and its consultants for absolute worst case 
scenario estimates of the Opera’s future expenses. Mean-
while, the DTC simply came up with the cost estimates 
themselves. Managing director Mark Hadley described this 
process as follows: “They were working on very broad pro 
formas that they had developed with outside consultants. 
It was in very broad strokes. So we had to guess on what 
some things would be, but honestly, we weren’t that far 
off. We took whatever information we had from them and 
then threw our decades of experience in.”
The business plan’s broadness frustrated some funders, 
too. In addition to worrying about the impact of increased 
competition for philanthropic funds, they also expressed 
concerns about the impact of aggressive revenue targets. 
Bruce Esterline, vice president for grants for the Meadows 
Foundation, worried about the effect of the AT&T PAC on 
the larger cultural ecology in Dallas. “We were concerned 
about the impact of higher rents on the resident perform-
ing arts groups, some of whom were dealing with their 
own financial challenges at the time,” he said. 
The mayor’s office had concerns, too. They wanted cer-
tainty that the AT&T PAC would not need more than $2.5 
million a year in unearned income to operate. They were 
afraid the Center would need more money from the city, 
and a privately raised endowment to support their opera-
tions seemed like a good idea. Former councilwoman 
Veletta Lill said Lively assuaged the local government of-
ficials’ concerns by promising that the Center would raise 
an endowment once the capital campaign was complete. 
T
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THE  DECIS ION
s the AT&T PAC surpassed the original $275 mil-
lion goal set for its capital campaign, its leaders 
could look back with satisfaction on a multi-
year record of success in attracting large gifts. With 20 
months still left before opening, there was time to raise 
even more funds for the future Center. Moreover, multiple 
suggestions for aesthetic and operational enhancements 
to the two halls seemed attractive and had broad sup-
port among the trustees. One major component of this 
expansion in capital budget would fund a more luxuri-
ous lobby. Another would turn a space currently suited 
only for rehearsals into a space that could accommodate 
smaller scale performances and host special events, 
expanding the Center’s opportunities for earning income. 
These suggested enhancements would require extend-
ing the capital campaign and raising an additional $60 
million. Yet the new Center also had to consider raising 
operational funds and replacing Lively, an experienced 
fundraiser and a critical orchestrator of the campaign so 
far, who planned to depart before the Center’s opening. 
How could the leaders of the AT&T PAC decide on the 
amount of funds they could reasonably expect to raise? 
How should they choose the right point to transition 
the focus of the organization from fundraising to future 
operations? 
A
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OUTCOMES
 n January 2008, on the day Nancy Hamon made the 
$10 million pledge that put the AT&T PAC over its target, 
the board unanimously approved an increase of the 
capital campaign goal from $275 million to $338 million. 
The success of the campaign to date was a significant 
factor in their decision. Given the scale and budget to 
which the board had already committed, compromising on 
any aspect of the campus was difficult. By approving the 
campaign’s capital expansion, the board was committing 
to raising an additional $63 million for construction costs 
before undertaking a long-discussed campaign for an 
operational endowment. Twenty months were remaining 
until opening. The costs of building the new performing 
arts center continued to rise. 
Lively left at the end of December of the same year to 
raise money for his other passion—football—at the helm 
of the Superbowl XLV host committee. After completing 
that project, he agreed to take the position of CEO of the 
AT&T PAC’s neighbor, the Dallas Symphony, but resigned 
the job before starting, citing health reasons. By the time 
of his departure from the AT&T PAC, $327 million had been 
raised for the capital campaign and an additional $18 mil-
lion was committed for other purposes, like moving costs 
for the resident groups and a small endowment. 
The AT&T Performing Arts Center’s grand opening in Oc-
tober 2009 attracted large crowds and attention from the 
international press. By then, the financial crisis had already 
begun. At the beginning of fiscal year 2010, in August, new 
pledges towards the capital campaign stopped coming 
in. The reported total of capital campaign contributions 
was still only $330 million. All construction bills were paid 
by virtue of $150 million in construction bonds issued in 
2006 and due for repayment in 2041. As of August 2011, 
the AT&T PAC was still $50 million short of covering these 
bonds. Both the sluggish pace of recession fundraising 
and operating deficits in the first two years of operations 
contributed to this shortfall. 
The operational deficits were exacerbated by the reces-
sion. In the first two years, the City of Dallas contributed 
only $0.8 million a year instead of the expected $2.5 
million. This amount is expected to decrease to $0.2 mil-
lion for 2012. Early estimates of operating income proved 
optimistic, and the AT&T PAC began its first year hoping to 
raise $5-6 million in annual funds. When both fundraising 
and revenues proved disappointing, the Center finished 
its first year with a deficit just short of $3 million. In the 
second year, this deficit increased further still. 
The tenants of the new performing arts center have also 
faced financial challenges. The Dallas Theater Center 
expected the costs of operating in their new venue to 
increase dramatically and launched a $12 million advance-
ment campaign to cover the expenses of growing into its 
new venue. By May 2011, $8 million of the total had been 
pledged, and these funds have reduced the impact from 
the economic recession and higher operating costs. The 
Dallas Opera also found its costs increasing due to higher 
facility costs and the more artistically ambitious program 
that the change of venue had made possible. In its first 
year at the AT&T PAC, the deficit for the Opera was $1.5 
million, and for the second, $4 million. These mount-
ing deficits forced the Opera to cut one of its full-scale 
productions for the 2011-2012 season in an attempt to 
balance the budget.
For the Center, finishing the campaign with the buildings 
already in existence is proving to be a grind. To some de-
gree, this was due to the recession, but to another, it is due 
to the difficulties inherent in raising money outside of the 
building process. Before, the dream for the transformative 
power of a new performing arts center was easier to evoke 
for prospective donors. Now, the AT&T PAC is a reality 
rather than a dream. Its ambitions for transforming Dallas 
are still there, but daily compromises, large and small, are 
needed to navigate operational and financial challenges. 
The new performing arts center is no longer a blank can-
vas for any and all civic dreams.
I
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F IGURE  I
CAPITAL  CAMPAIG N  
PLEDGES  BY  Y EAR
Based on news articles and press releases
P ro gre ss  o f  t he  D a l l a s  Cente r  fo r  t he  Pe r fo rming  A r t s  Cap i t a l  Camp a ig n 
U S D M i l l i ons
Key  M i l e s to ne s : 2002 :
Bo ard  se t s
c am pa i gn  t a rg e t
a t  $275  m i l l i i on
Win s pea r 
fam i l y  
m ake s  a 
$4 2  m i l l i on  g i f t
2004 :
Wyl y 
fam i l y  p l ed ges 
$20  m i l l i on
2006 :
$ 150  m i l l i on 
i n  const ruc t i on 
b onds 
g ua ran teed  by 
p l ed ges  i s sues
2008 :
Campa i g n 
reaches  o r i g i na l 
t a rge t  o f  $275 
m i l l i on .  Boa rd 
unan i mous l y 
ap proves  ra i s i ng 
t a rge t  to  $338 
m i l l i on .
D ec  2008 :
B i l l  L i ve l y 
f i n i shes  h i s 
te rm  as 
P res i d en t  and 
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